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ABSTRACT
To solve a problem, needed information and problem-solving capabilities
must be brought together. Often the information used in technical problem
solving is costly to acquire, transfer, and use in a new locus - is, in our terms,
"sticky." In this paper we explore the impact of information stickiness on the
locus of innovation-related problem solving. We find, first, that when sticky
information needed by problem solvers is held at one site only, problem solving
will be carried out at that locus, other things being equal. Second, when more
than one locus of sticky information is called upon by problem solvers, the locus
of problem solving may iterate among these sites as problem solving proceeds.
When the cost of such iteration is high, then third, problems that draw upon
multiple sites of sticky information will sometimes be partitioned into
subproblems that each draw on only one such locus, and/or, fourth, investments
will be made to reduce the stickiness of information at some locations.
Information stickiness appears to affect a number of issues of importance
to researchers and practitioners. Among these are patterns in the diffusion of
information, the specialization of firms, the locus of innovation, and the nature of
problems selected by problem solvers.
3"Sticky Information" and the Locus of Problem Solving:
Implications for Innovation
1. Introduction
To solve a problem, needed information and problem-solving capabilities
must be brought together - physically or "virtually" - at a single locus. The need
to transfer information from its point of origin to a specified problem-solving
site will not affect the locus of problem-solving activity when that information
can be shifted at no or little cost. However, when information is costly to
acquire, transfer, and use - is, in our terms, "sticky" - we find that patterns in the
distribution of problem solving can be affected in several significant ways. In
this paper we explore this general matter within the specific context of technical,
innovation-related problem solving.
It has not always been clear that technical information used by innovators
in the course of their problem-solving work might be costly to transfer from
place to place. Indeed, the central tendency in economic theorizing has been to
view information as costlessly transferable, and much of the research on the
special character of markets for information has been based precisely on this
characteristic. Thus, Arrow observes that "the cost of transmitting a given body
of information is frequently very low.... In the absence of special legal
protection, the owner cannot, however, simply sell information on the open
market. Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce
the information at little or no cost" (1962, 614-15). However, a number of
scholars with an empirical as well as theoretical interest in the economics and
diffusion of technological information have long argued, and to some extent
4shown, that the costs of information transfer in technical projects can vary
significantly (Nelson 1959,1982, Rosenberg 1982, Griliches 1957, Mansfield
1968, Pavitt 1987, and Teece 1977).
In this paper we first review and draw on the work of these scholars to
provide a reasoned basis for our assumption that information used by technical
problem solvers is in fact often "sticky" (section 2). We then explore four
patterns in the locus of innovation-related problem solving that appear related to
information stickiness. First, when information needed for innovation-related
problem solving is held at one locus as sticky information, the locus of problem-
solving activity will tend to take place at that site (section 3). Second, when
more than one locus of sticky information is called upon by problem solvers, the
locus of problem-solving activity may move iteratively among such sites as
innovation development work proceeds (section 4). Third, when the costs of such
iteration are high, problem-solving activities that draw upon multiple sites of
sticky information will sometimes be "task partitioned" into subproblems that
each draw on only one such locus (section 5). Fourth, when the costs of iteration
are high, efforts will sometimes be directed toward investing in "unsticking" or
reducing the stickiness of information held at some sites (section 6).
Finally, we will conclude the paper with a discussion of the likely impact of
information stickiness on a number of issues of interest to innovation researchers
and practitioners. For example, we will reason that the incentives to invest in
reducing the stickiness of given information are affected by how frequently that
information is a candidate for transfer. Such a pattern would, in turn, offer an
economic explanation for a general shift of innovation-related problem solving
toward users, as in the current trend in which the producers of software and
other products seek to "empower" users by offering them tools that reduce the
cost of problem solving and innovation carried out user sites (section 7).
2. "Sticky" Information
As an aid to exploring patterns in the locus of innovation-related problem
solving as a function of information transfer costs, we coin the term "sticky"
information. We define the stickiness of a given unit of information in a given
instance as the incremental expenditure required to transfer that unit of
information to a specified locus in a form usable by a given information seeker.
When this cost is low, information stickiness is low; when it is high, stickiness is
high. Note that in our definition, information stickiness involves not only
attributes of the information itself, but attributes of and choices made by
information seekers and information providers. For example, if a particular
information seeker is inefficient or less able in acquiring information unit x (e.g.,
because of a lack of certain tools or complementary information), or if a
particular information provider decides to charge for access to unit x, the
stickiness of unit x will be higher than it might be under other conditions. The
purpose of being inclusive with respect to causes of information stickiness in this
definition is to allow us to focus on the impact of information stickiness
independent of cause.
As noted earlier, a number of reasons have been advanced and explored as
to why information might be sticky. Some reasons have to do with the nature of
the information itself, some with the amount of information that must be
transferred, and some with attributes of the seekers and providers of the
information.
With respect to the impact of the nature of the information to be
transferred on variations in information stickiness, consider that some
information is encoded in explicit terms, while some is "tacit." Polanyi has
pointed out that many human skills, and much human expertise, both extensively
employed in technical problem solving, are of the latter sort. He observes that
"the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules
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6which are not known as such to the person following them" (Polanyi 1958, 49,
italicized in original). For example, swimmers are probably not aware of the
rules they employ to keep afloat, e.g., in exhaling, they do not completely empty
their lungs, nor are medical experts generally aware of the rules they follow in
order to reach a diagnosis of various symptoms. "Indeed," he says, "even in
modem industries the indefinable knowledge is still an essential part of
technology." And, Polanyi reasons, "an art which cannot be specified in detail
cannot be transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can
be passed on only by example from master to apprentice..." - a relatively costly
mode of transfer (ibid., 52,53).
Rosenberg (1982) argues that drawing on technologically useful
information involves not just dealing with theoretical knowledge derived from
science, but requires breaking open and examining what transpires "inside the
black box" of technological phenomena. Indeed, much technological knowledge
is costly, difficult, and slow to diffuse since it deals with "the specific and the
particular," consists of "innumerable small increments...," and may well be tacit
(1976,78). Nelson argues that technological knowledge is "partly a private good
and partly a public one," that is, (1) "a set of specific designs and practices," and
(2) "a body of generic knowledge that surrounds these and provides
understanding of how things work...."(1990,1,8,13). The former is often
relatively costly and difficult to acquire, learn to use, and diffuse (Nelson 1982),
and thus can be private its creators in certain respects (Nelson and Winter 1982,
chap.4). In contrast, "generic knowledge not only tends to be germane to a wide
variety of uses and users. Such knowledge is the stock in trade of professionals in
a field, and there tends to grow up a systematic way of describing and
communicating such knowledge, so that when new generic knowledge is created
anywhere, it is relatively costless to communicate to other professionals" (1990,
11-12).
7The cost of transferring information sufficient to solve a given innovation-
related problem can also vary according to the amount of information called for
by a technical problem solver. Sometimes stickiness is high because a great deal
of information with a non-zero transfer cost per unit is drawn upon to complete
innovation development work. Thus, successful anticipation and avoidance of all
field problems that might affect a new airplane (Rosenberg 1982, chap. 6) or a
new process machine (von Hippel and Tyre 1993) or a new type of laser (Collins
1982) would require that a very large amount of information about the use
environment be transferred to the development lab - because one does not know
in advance which subset of that information will be relevant to anticipating
potential failures. Scientists trying to build a successful copy of a research
apparatus often face great difficulties for the same reason. "It's very difficult to
make a carbon copy [of a gravity wave detector]. You can make a near one, but
if it turns out that what's critical is the way he glued his transducers, and he
forgets to tell you that the technician always puts a copy of Physical Review on
top of them for weight, well, it could make all the difference" (interviewee in
Collins 1975, 213).
Information stickiness can also be high because organizations must typically
have or acquire related information and skills to be able to use the new
knowledge that may be transferred to them. (For example, artists seeking to
generate computer art using the mathematics of fractals will not typically be
aided by receipt of a software program designed for mathematicians. They must
either get the information they seek in "user friendly" form [which in practice
means that the transmitter must understand what the recipients already know or
can easily learn and must adapt access to the new information accordingly] and/or
the recipients must learn the additional complementary information needed to use
the existing math program.) Thus, Pavitt points out that "even borrowers of
technology must have their own skills, and make their own expenditures on
8development and production engineering; they cannot treat technology developed
elsewhere as a free, or even very cheap, good" (1987,186). Similarly, Cohen
and Levinthal argue that a firm's learning or absorptive capacity with respect to
new, outside technical information is "largely a function of the firm's prior
related knowledge." This stock of knowledge includes not only "basic skills or
even a shared language ... " but also knowledge generated in the course of a firm's
own R&D, marketing and manufacturing operations, and technical training
programs (1990,128-29). And, again similarly, Evenson and Kislev find in
studies of the economic impact of scientific research on agricultural productivity
that "little knowledge is borrowed if no indigenous research takes place"
(1973,1314).
Information stickiness can also vary due to other attributes of an
information transmitter and receiver. For example, it has been shown that
specialized personnel such as "technological gatekeepers" (Allen 1977, Katz and
Allen 1982, Katz and Tushman 1980) and specialized organizational structures
such as transfer groups (Katz and Allen 1988) can significantly affect the cost of
transferring a given unit of information between organizations. And, of course,
the decisions of information possessors as to the pricing of access to proprietary
information also directly affects the stickiness of that information.
Evidence on the costs of transferring technical information from place to
place during innovation-related problem solving also supports the view that
technical information can be sticky. A number of empirical studies have been
carried out on the costs of transferring a product or process technology from one
firm or location to another with full cooperation on both sides. These show that
the costs of information transfer do vary and can be significant. Thus Teece
(1977) studied 26 international technology transfer projects and examined the
costs of transmitting and absorbing all the relevant unembodied technological
knowledge (i.e., information on methods of organization and operations, quality
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control, manufacturing procedures, and associated information, but not the
knowledge embodied in capital goods, blueprints, or technical specifications). He
found that transfer costs varied widely for the projects in his sample, ranging
from 2 percent to 59 percent of total project costs, and averaging 19 percent - a
considerable fraction (1977, 245, 247).
In sum then, it does appear likely that information sought by technical
problem solvers will often be sticky. Therefore it will be useful to examine the
effects that information stickiness might have on the locus of innovation-related
problem solving. In the following sections we identify four such effects.
3. Sticky Information and the Locus of Innovation-Related Problem Solving
When information transfer costs are a significant component of the costs of
the planned problem-solving work, it is reasonable that there will be a tendency
to carry out innovation-related problem-solving activity out at the locus of sticky
information, other things being equal - just as, in the case of production, it is
reasonable that a firm will seek to locate its factory at a location that will
minimize transportation costs, other things being equal.
Evidence bearing on this matter can be found in a number of places. Thus,
Rosenberg (1982, chap.6) describes "learning by using," which involves problem
solving carried out in use environments by, typically, product users. For
example, after a given jet engine had been in use for a decade, the cost of
maintenance declined to only 30 percent of the initial level because users had
learned to perform this task better (ibid.,131). Rosenberg argues that such
learning by using must be carried out at the user locus because that is the site of
the information drawn upon by problem solvers. Similarly, agricultural
researchers seeking to develop new plant varieties that will flourish under given
local conditions often find it efficient to shift problem solving to sites where such
conditions exist. Griliches (1957), for example, observed that the complex,
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innovative process of developing hybrid corn seed was carried out separately by
local agricultural experiment stations and private seed companies in order to
incorporate unique location-specific factors (such as soil type, topography, length
of growing season, fertilizer requirements, rainfall, and insect and disease
resistance) required in a hybrid for that specific locality.
Finally, Mowery and Rosenberg (1989, chap.4) proposed that independent
research contractors are most likely to supply research services that exploit little
or no firm-specific knowledge because such knowledge is, in our terminology,
sticky. To test their hypothesis, they examined the content of all projects carried
out by three major independent R&D contracting firms (the Mellon Institute, the
Battelle Memorial Institute and Arthur D. Little, Inc.) from 1900 and 1940.
They found that the bulk of the projects carried out by the independent R&D
contractors were of a nature that required a relatively small amount of firm-
specific knowledge, and reasoned that the projects requiring high firm-specific
knowledge had been carried out in client firms' internal labs. This finding is
what we would expect if the locus of problem solving is affected by the locus of
sticky information.
4. Sticky Information and "Iteration"
Research into the nature of problem solving shows it to consist of trial and
error, directed by some amount of insight as to the direction in which a solution
might lie (Barron 1988, 43-47). This general finding is reflected in studies of
problem solving in engineering, which show trial and error (or, more precisely,
trial, failure, learning, revision, and retrial) as a prominent feature (Marples
1961, Allen 1966). Sometimes the trial and error that technical problem solvers
engage in will draw on sticky information located at more than one locus. In
such instances, we reason that economical problem solving can involve
"iteration," that is, the locus of problem-solving activity may shift to and among
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the sites of sticky information as innovation development work proceeds (von
Hippel 1990a).
Iteration of the predicted type can often be observed in the problem solving
involved in new product and service development. In these arenas two
information bases located - at least, initially - in physically different places, are
typically important for successful problem solving. The first is information on
need, located initially with the user. The second is information on solution
technologies, located initially at the site of the manufacturer. If need information
is sticky at the site of the potential product user, and if solution information is
sticky at the site of the product developer, we may see a pattern in which problem-
solving activity shuttles back and forth between these two sites.
USER-MFR
MFR ACTIVITY BOUNDARY USER ACTIVITY
user draws on local need information
to specify desired product or service
manufacturer draws on local
capability information to
develop prototype
responsive to specifications
user evaluates prototype, drawing
on local information regarding
application context, and improves/
changes specifications as evidence
dictates
manufacturer iterates
until user satisfied 
user iterates until satisfied
Figure 1: Iterative Problem-Solving Pattern Often Encountered in New Product
and Service Development
Thus, as shown schematically in Figure 1, a problem solver may first draw on
user need information to generate some attributes for a desired new product or
service. Then, manufacturer information may be drawn upon in order to
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develop a prototype that appears responsive to the specification. The prototype is
next tested within its proposed use context to verify function and the accuracy of
the initially stated need. If the two do not match satisfactorily - and they often do
not - the loci of need and/or capability information must be revisited in search of
a closer match. This cycle may be repeated few or many times until an
acceptable match is found.
This pattern of iterative shifting of innovation development activity from
site to site will be less costly than the transfer of sticky information to a single
problem-solving locus given a key condition: The intermediate outputs of
problem solving conducted at each locus that are transferred between sites must
be less sticky than the information operated upon to produce the outputs.
Intuitively it seems reasonable that this will often be the case: Such an
intermediate output may be in the form of nonembodied information transferable
at low cost, or it may be in the form of a prototype that can be economically
transferred. For example, an artist may not be able to transfer all information
involved in the creative process that brings him or her to specify to a supplier, "I
need a green paint of precisely X hue and luminance." However, that
(nonembodied) need specification is very simple and precise, and it can be
transferred at very low cost. Similarly, the responding paint manufacturer may
be able to create and transfer the requested shade of green to the artist (embodied
in a prototype or final product), but not be able to transfer the complex
knowledge drawn on by that firm's chemists to achieve the feat.
Recent empirical studies report the iterative problem-solving pattern
described in Figure 1. Tyre and von Hippel (1993) explored the innovation-
related problem solving involved in identifying and diagnosing 27 field failures
in process equipment used to automatically assemble complex circuit boards.
They observed repeated shifts in the locus of technical problem-solving activity
occurring during this work, with the number of shifts found ranging from 0 to 7,
llI
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and averaging about 2.3 times per problem identified and diagnosed (Figure 2).
These shifts involved engineers traveling back and forth between development lab
and plant (two to three hours by car), carrying out technical problem-solving
activities at each site, and carrying intermediate findings back and forth in their
minds and/or computer data disks. For example, to begin the diagnosis of a
machine that was failing in the field, the designers of that particular machine
would often visit the plant where it was being used in order to observe the
malfunction in context and run diagnostic tests. Then they would return to the
development lab (the site of specialized lab equipment, relevant expertise, and
other types of information) to examine the test results and continue their
diagnostic work. Often this work would lead to the need for a second trip to the
field for more data collection, and so forth.
FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF SHIFTS BETWEEN PLANT AND
LAB DURING PROBLEM SOLVING
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Source: Tyre and von Hippel 1993
In this study, the cost of the iterative shifting of innovation-related problem-
solving activity observed did appear to be less than the cost of transferring all
information needed by technical problem solvers to a single locus - say, the
i r
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development lab. While no particular item of information found useful for
diagnosing a particular process machine malfunction was very costly to transfer
from the plant to the development lab, the specific items needed by the lab could
not be identified without problem-solving and trial-and-error activities conducted
in the plant. As a consequence, shifting all information needed to diagnose field
problems from plant to lab would have meant shifting a great deal of information
effectively the entire use environment - from plant to lab (von Hippel and Tyre
1993). Carrying out such a massive information transfer would have been much
more costly than the iterative transfer of problem-solving activity between plant
and lab that was found to have taken place.
In studying product innovation in the Danish food industry Kristensen
(1992) observed a similar iterative pattern. Here, information is passed back and
forth between Danish food producers and customers located in culturally,
linguistically, and geographically distant markets. Often, prototypes are used as
the medium for information transfer because, as Kristensen points out,
"prototypes are not only inexpensive and fast to produce in the food products
industry; they are also small and inexpensive to transport." When, for example, a
Danish bakery firm was asked to develop a new frozen unbaked cake by a British
retail food chain, the bakery's production department responded by developing
several prototypes of the proposed cake and sending them to the customer to
bake, taste, and smell, and to evaluate on the basis of "local tastes and the situation
they were meant for - a type of social gathering not practised in Denmark."
Comments on the baked cakes were sent back to the producer, who adjusted the
recipes accordingly, "using his familarity with baking and with local raw
materials." In total, "five successive revised generations were sent during the
course of three months before the Danish producer and the UK retail chain's test
kitchen reached the generation of satisfactory variations." Kristensen reports that
over 40 percent of the 103 Danish food producers he studied had developed one
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or more products within the previous two years via such iterative interactions
with customers (Kristensen 1992, 204-5, 210).
The likely ubiquity of the iteration pattern we describe is suggested by the
recent emergence of product development procedures specifically designed to
implement such a pattern. For example "rapid prototyping" is a method of
software development explicitly designed to shuttle repeatedly between
manufacturer and users, replacing the traditional, specification-driven
("waterfall") method of software development. In that traditional method,
systems analysts meet with users at the start of a project to determine user needs
and agree on a written product requirements specification, and they then work
isolated from further user contact until the completed product is delivered (six to
eight months or up to two years or more), all too often "late, overbudget and not
what the customer wanted" (Zelkowitz 1980, 1037). In the rapid prototyping
method, manufacturers respond to initial user need inputs by quickly developing
and delivering to users (usually within weeks) an inexpensive, easy to modify,
working model that simulates a lot of the functionality of the proposed new
software. Users then learn by using the prototype in their own setting on their
own data and clarify their needs, in part by drawing on their tacit knowledge and
experience (Gronbaek 1989, 114-16). Users then relay requests for change or
new features to the software developers, who respond by drawing on their own
sticky information and tools to make modifications to the prototype. Some of
these modifications are minor, such as altering report formats, and some are
major, such as implementing a new feature or modifying the basic structure of
the prototype (Feld 1990, 14). A revised prototype is then sent to the user, and
this process of iteration between developer and user is repeated an acceptable fit
between need and solution is found. A number of individual case studies and
experiments have shown that rapid prototyping methods are not only less costly
than traditional, noniterative methods but are able to "better satisfy true user
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requirements and produce information and functionality that is more complete,
more accurate, and more meaningful" (Connell and Shafer 1989, 15; Boehm,
Gray, and Seewaldt 1984; Gomaa 1983).
5. Sticky Information and "Task Partitioning"
When more than one locus of sticky information must be drawn upon to
solve a problem, common experience suggests that even iteration can sometimes
be very costly with respect to time and effort. For example, no patient likes the
shuffling back and forth and time lags involved when a medical condition
involves even routine diagnostic tests by and coordinated problem solving among
several physicians in different specialties. And, similarly, no designer likes the
cost in time and money and frustration involved in repeated redesign of a finished
product or service as a result of new information uncovered as a result of test
marketing conducted at user sites.
As a consequence, we reason that when the information transfer costs of
iteration are high, innovation-related problem-solving activities that require
access to multiple loci of sticky information will sometimes be "task partitioned"
into subproblems that each draw on only one such locus of sticky information.
Because there are many different ways to partition a given innovation project, the
selection of a particular partitioning can have a very strong effect on how much
information from one task must be drawn upon to solve another as the technical
problem-solving work progresses (von Hippel 1990b). As a schematic
illustration, consider two alternative ways of partitioning the project of designing
a new airplane:
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- "Firm X is responsible for the design of the aircraft body, and firm Y is
responsible for the design of the engine,
and:
- "Firm X is responsible for designing the front half of both the aircraft
body and engine, and firm Y is responsible for designing the back half of
both.
Taken together, each of these proposed task partitionings has the same
project outcome - a complete aircraft design. But the two differ greatly with
respect to the level of information exchange and/or iterative relocation of
problem-solving activities. Clearly, information transfer costs would be much
higher in the second alternative than in the first: Many design decisions affecting
the shape of the "front half' of an aircraft body would force related changes on
the designers of the "back half' of the body, and vice versa, because the two
halves cannot be considered independently with respect to aerodynamics.
As a real world example of the task partitioning of an innovation project,
consider the problem-solving work involved in designing a silicon integrated
circuit on a semiconductor chip for a custom application. In this design problem,
two sticky data bases are central to the problem-solving work: (1) information at
the circuit user locus involving a rich and complex understanding of both the
overall application in which the custom integrated circuit will play a role and the
specific function required of that circuit; (2) information at the circuit
manufacturer locus involving a rich and complex understanding of the constraints
and possibilities of the silicon fabrication process that the manufacturer uses to
produce integrated circuits.
Traditionally, custom integrated circuits were developed in an iterative
Figure 1-like process between a circuit user possessing sticky need information
and an integrated circuit manufacturer possessing sticky information about
designing and producing silicon integrated circuits. The process would begin
with a user specifying the functions that the custom chip was to perform to a
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circuit design specialist employed by the integrated circuit manufacturer. The
chip would then be designed at the manufacturer locus, and an (expensive)
prototype would be produced and sent to the user. Testing by the user would
typically reveal faults in the chip and/or the initial specification, responsive
changes would be made, a new prototype built, and so forth.
More recently, the Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) method
of making custom integrated circuits has come into wide practice. In the ASIC
method, the overall problem of designing custom circuits is partitioned into
subproblems which each draw on only one locus of sticky information, thereby
eliminating the need to iterate between two such sites in the design process. The
manufacturer of ASICs draws on its own sticky information to develop and
improve the fabrication processes in its manufacturing plant, a "silicon foundry."
The manufacturer also draws on its own sticky information to design "standard"
silicon wafers that contain an array of unconnected circuit elements such as logic
gates. These standard circuit elements arrays are designed by the manufacturer
to be interconnectable into working integrated circuits by the later addition of
custom interconnection layers designed in accordance with the needs of specific
users. To facilitate this user task, the manufacturer provides custom circuit users
with a user-friendly Computer-Aided Design (CAD) software package that
enables them to design a custom interconnection layer design to meet their
specific application needs and yet stay within the production capabilities of the
manufacturer's silicon foundry. This CAD software also allows the user to
simulate the function of the custom circuit under design, and to conduct trial-and-
error experiments. Taken together, these capabilities allow the user to both
design a circuit, and to refine need specifications and the desired circuit function
through an iterative process that draws only on sticky information located at the
user site. In sum, by partitioning the overall circuit design task somewhat
differently than is done in the traditional method, the ASIC method of designing
III
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custom integrated circuits reduces the need for the iterative shifting of the locus
of innovation-related problem solving between user and manufacturer.
6. Sticky Information and Investing in "Unsticking" Information
The stickiness of a given body of information is not immutable. Thus,
when the costs of iteration are considered to be high, efforts will sometimes be
directed toward investing in "unsticking" or reducing the stickiness of some of
the information. For example, firms may reduce the stickiness of a critical form
of technical expertise by investing in converting some of that expertise from tacit
knowledge to the more explicit and easily transferable form of a software "expert
system"(Davis 1986). Or they may invest in reducing the stickiness of
information of interest to users by converting it into a remotely accessible and
user-friendly computer data base. This is what the travel industry did, for
example, when it invested substantial sums to put its various data bases for airline
schedules, hotel reservations, and car rentals "on-line" in a user-accessible form.
However, incentives to unstick information can vary. For example,
suppose that to solve a particular problem, two units of equally sticky
information are required, one from a user and one from a manufacturer. In that
case, there will be an equal incentive operating to unstick either of these units of
information in order to reduce the cost of transfer, other things (such as the cost
of unsticking) being equal. But now suppose that there is reason to expect that
one of the units of information, say the manufacturer's, will be a candidate for
transfer n times in the future, while the user's unit of information will be of
interest to problem solvers only once. For example, suppose that a manufacturer
expects to have to have the same technical information called on repeatedly to
solve n user product application problems and each problem involves unique user
information. In that case, the total incentive to unstick the manufacturer's
information across the entire series of user problems is n times higher than the
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incentive for an individual user to unstick its problem-related information. And,
as an important consequence, it is reasonable that the locus of problem-solving
activity will tend to shift to the locus of the less frequently called-upon
information - in the case of our example, to the user.
As illustration, recall the shift from the traditional iterative method of
designing custom integrated circuits to the ASIC task partitioning method that we
described earlier. During the problem-solving work of circuit design, each
circuit designer requires access to the same information about the constraints of
the circuit manufacturing process, but requires different information about the
specific application being designed for. As a consequence, the ASIC
manufacturer found it economic to unstick the repeatedly called-upon production
process information by investing in encoding it in a user-friendly CAD package.
And, as a further consequence, the problem-solving activity of custom circuit
design was shifted to the locus of sticky information regarding each unique
application - the user.
The particular pattern just described will often hold in real-world problem
solving we suggest, because it offers a way for manufacturers to seek economies
of scale by producing standard products, while at the same time enabling users to
carry out the problem solving needed to adapt these to specific local needs and
conditions. Consider, for example, the current trend in software (Feld 1990)
toward "empowering users." To empower users, manufacturers invest in
unsticking some of their programming expertise and information by offering
user-friendly programming languages such as Object Oriented Programming
(OOPs), and user-tailorable application programs or tool boxes. This has the
effect of shifting the problem-solving activity involved in tailoring software to
local conditions to the locus of sticky information regarding those local
conditions - the user.
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7. Discussion and Suggestions for Further Research
In this paper we have begun to explore the impact of sticky information on
the locus of innovation-related problem solving, and we propose that further
study of information stickiness can be of significant value and interest to both
innovation researchers and innovation practitioners.
In the course of our initial work we have observed and discussed four
patterns in the distribution of innovation-related problem solving associated with
efforts made by technical problem solvers to reduce information transfer costs.
First, when technical information that is costly to acquire, transfer, and use is
held in one locus of sticky information, innovation-related problem-solving
activities will tend to move to that locus; second, when more than one locus of
sticky information is called upon to solve a problem, the locus of problem-
solving activity will tend to iterate among these sticky information sites as
innovation development work proceeds; third, when the information transfer
costs of iteration are high, innovation-related problem-solving activities that
require access to multiple loci of sticky information will sometimes be "task
partitioned" into subproblems that each draw on only one such locus of sticky
information; and fourth, when the information transfer costs of iteration are
high, investments may be made toward investing in "unsticking" or reducing the
stickiness of information held at some sites.
This short list is not intended to be exhaustive, and further work may
identify additional patterns as well as usefully elaborate on the four already
identified. For example, in the present paper we have not examined patterns in
the distribution of innovation-related problem solving that will be visible when a
problem can be solved using only technical information that can be acquired,
transferred, and used without cost or nearly so. We speculate that, in such cases,
the locus of problem-solving activities will depend on the costs associated with
locating the noninformation components necessary to the technical problem-
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solving work. Problems appropriate for problem solvers who "telecommute" can
fall into this category because the data inputs and outputs called upon can be sent
nearly anywhere at low cost over telecommunication networks. Therefore
telecommuters can locate themselves wherever they and their employers find it
most cost-effective and convenient to carry out their problem-solving work.
Innovation practitioners may wish to use the information transfer patterns
we have discussed in this paper to consciously manage their information transfer
costs. The value of doing this in any particular circumstance will depend on these
strategies not adversely affecting other innovation cost factors or an innovators'
abilities to appropriate innovation-related benefit. We think this can often be the
case even though, on the face of it, the latter condition seems problematic. After
all, patents and trade secrecy and lead time can all be important to an innovator's
ability to profit from an innovation (von Hippel 1988, chap.5), and these all
depend on an innovator's maintaining at least some secrecy at least for a while.
But how can one expect an innovating firm to keep secrets if it conducts problem
solving not on the innovator's premises but at sites of sticky information? For
example, would not a firm that wants to keep a chemical formula a trade secret
be ill-advised to conduct some of the technical development work at a customer
site?
Often, however, conducting innovation-related problem solving at remote
sites need not compromise an innovator's ability to keep commercially important
secrets. First, consider that firms can come to some legal arrangement that will
maintain secrecy for problem solving done at another locus. Second, consider
that firms routinely do locate some of this type of problem solving off their
premises without taking legal precautions, and with no apparent impact on their
ability to appropriate benefit from their innovations. In some instances, this is
explicable because the innovation development task undertaken outside the firm is
just a piece of the whole, and revealing a part does not reveal the whole to would-
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be imitators. Thus, firms routinely ask outside suppliers to develop components
of an innovative product, engage in market research and product testing on
customer sites, and so forth. In other instances, an innovation being worked upon
without benefit of secrecy is nonetheless protected because it is tied in some way
to a product or service or process that is protected. Thus, a supplier of a
proprietary computer program may benefit from nonproprietary improvements
to it, because the improvements will only operate in conjunction with the
proprietary program.
The concept of information stickiness can also enable us to understand
more about patterns of specialization among individuals and firms. Since an
organizational boundary can add to the cost of information transfer, it seems
likely that firms seeking to economize with respect to the transfer of sticky
information will seek to align their organizational boundaries - and their
specializations - with the partitionings dictated by the types of innovation-related
problem-solving tasks that are important to them. For similar reasons,
consideration of the impact of sticky information may be useful in studying the
various collaborative innovation patterns that are being practiced by firms today
(e.g., Gemunden 1980). We also propose that studies of sticky information can
increase our understanding of how firms protect, sell, trade, diffuse, and
appropriate benefit from information. Thus, stickiness can help the possessors of
valuable information to prevent unintentional diffusion to competitors, but that
same property may make it more costly to diffuse the information intentionally.
Studies that use information stickiness as a variable can also help
researchers to explore patterns in the nature of problems selected by technical
problem solvers. It seem reasonable that problems that involve low information
transfer costs would tend to be selected preferentially. Thus, a firm may elect to
develop new products that draw on local information in preference to those that
require costly information transfers from suppliers or users or others. Similarly,
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responses to information transfer costs, such as a decision to partition problem-
solving tasks in a different way, or to unstick certain information, can affect the
kind of solutions that technical problem solvers may develop to a given problem.
For example, the development of single-site "desk-top publishing" (which
removed the need for iterative problem solving among author, graphic designer,
and printer) may well enable author/"publishers" to create very different
documents as well as less expensive ones. And the development of home medical
diagnosis kits (which reduce the need for information transfers among patient,
doctor, and medical laboratory) may bring about qualitative and quantitative
changes in the type of medical care that is demanded and the way it is delivered.
Finally, it is interesting to speculate about the patterns in the locus of
innovation-related problem solving that will emerge as the computerization of
problem-solving activities continues to make information even more accessible
via computer networks and increasingly portable, inexpensive, and user-friendly
computer equipment and software. Taken together, these trends can certainly
facilitate "anywhere" problem solving when all of the information drawn upon to
solve a technical problem is nonsticky, as in the instance of telecommuting
discussed above. When information transfer costs vary and at least some of the
needed information is sticky, however, these same trends can make the patterns
discussed in this paper even more salient. Thus, researchers equipped with
computers and network access will be free to transfer their work to and among
field sites containing sticky information, managers will be free to move decision
making to the site of critical tasks, and product designers will be free to design
products working directly with users at user sites. It will be an interesting world
to develop and explore!
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